Interdisciplinary collaboration figures centrally in frontier research in many fields. Participants in inter-disciplinary projects face problems they would not encounter within their own disciplines. Among those are problems of mutual understanding, of finding a language to communicate both within projects and with the scientific community and society at large, and of needing to master concepts and methods of different disciplines. We think that a concentrated research and development effort is necessary to analyze, on the one hand, cognitive conditions of successful (...) understanding, communication, and interaction and, on the other, to develop specific tools and methods that support and facilitate inter-disciplinarity both in practice and in educational projects that prepare future generations of professionals within and outside of academia. Those tools need to be developed and their cognitive efficiency measured. (shrink)

Hesiod, um 700 vor Christus im armlichen Bootien lebend, ist nur wenig junger als Homer. Obwohl er von der hexametrischen Epik der "Ilias" und der "Odyssee" stark beeinflusst ist, bietet er in seinen beiden Werken "Vom Ursprung der Gotter" und "Werke und Tage" etwas vollig Neues: Zum ersten Mal in der europaischen Literaturgeschichte tritt uns ein Autor als Person entgegen. Er selbst erzahlt, wie die Musen ihm beim Schafehuten erschienen und den jungen Menschen zum Dichter beriefen.Ausserdem wird Hesiod zum Vater (...) einer eigenen literarischen Gattung: des Lehrgedichts. Er bringt die gottlichen Machte in verwandtschaftliche Beziehungen; so entsteht eine Deutung des Weltganzen, die bereits auf die philosophischen Entwurfe der vorsokratischen Denker vorausweist. Indem er die Erzahlungen uber die Gotter zusammenfasst und ordnet, wird Hesiod zur wichtigsten Quelle des griechischen Mythos. In den "Werken und Tagen," einer Art Bauernkalender, in den Bruchstucke einer ersten Autobiographie und einige beruhmte Sagen eingestreut sind, wirkt Hesiod mit seiner pessimistischen Beurteilung des eigenen Zeitalters erstaunlich aktuell. Mit Einfuhrung, Erlauterungen und Literaturhinweisen von E.G. Schmidt.". (shrink)

Human adults incline toward moral objectivism but may approach things more relativistically if different cultures are involved. In this study, 4-, 6-, and 9-year-old children (N = 136) witnessed two parties who disagreed about moral matters: a normative judge (e.g., judging that it is wrong to do X) and an antinormative judge (e.g., judging that it is okay to do X). We assessed children’s metaethical judgment, that is, whether they judged that only one party (objectivism) or both parties (relativism) could (...) be right. We found that 9-year-olds, but not younger children, were more likely to judge that both parties could be right when a normative ingroup judge disagreed with an antinormative extraterrestrial judge (with different preferences and background) than when the antinormative judge was another ingroup individual. This effect was not found in a comparison case where parties disagreed about the possibility of different physical laws. These findings suggest that although young children often exhibit moral objectivism, by early school age they begin to temper their objectivism with culturally relative metaethical judgments. (shrink)

Young children interpret some acts performed by adults as normatively governed, that is, as capable of being performed either rightly or wrongly. In previous experiments, children have made this interpretation when adults introduced them to novel acts with normative language (e.g. ‘this is the way it goes’), along with pedagogical cues signaling culturally important information, and with social-pragmatic marking that this action is a token of a familiar type. In the current experiment, we exposed children to novel actions with no (...) normative language, and we systematically varied pedagogical and social-pragmatic cues in an attempt to identify which of them, if either, would lead children to normative interpretations. We found that young 3-year-old children inferred normativity without any normative language and without any pedagogical cues. The only cue they used was adult socialpragmatic marking of the action as familiar, as if it were a token of a well-known type (as opposed to performing it, as if inventing it on the spot). These results suggest that – in the absence of explicit normative language – young children interpret adult actions as normatively governed based mainly on the intentionality (perhaps signaling conventionality) with which they are performed. (shrink)

Research on children's developing moral cognition has mostly focused on their evaluation of, and reasoning about, others' intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions (e.g., hitting, lying). But assertions may have morally relevant (intended or unintended) consequences, too. For instance, if someone wrongly claims that “This water is clean!”, such an incorrect representation of reality may have harmful consequences to others. In two experiments, we investigated preschoolers' evaluation of others' morally relevant factual claims. In Experiment 1, children witnessed a puppet making incorrect assertions (...) that would lead to harm or to no harm. In Experiment 2, incorrect assertions would always lead to harm, but the puppet either intended the harm to occur or not. Children evaluated the puppet’s factual claim more negatively when they anticipated harmful versus harmless consequences (Experiment 1) and when the puppet’s intention was bad versus good over and above harmful consequences (Experiment 2). These findings suggest that preschoolers’ normative understanding is not limited to evaluating others’ intrinsically harmful transgressions, but also entails an appreciation of the morally relevant consequences of, and intentions underlying, others’ factual claims. (shrink)

ZusammenfassunuIn dem vorliegenden Bericht über einige Arbeiten des Verfassers und eine daran anschliessende Arbeit von G. Emde, Marburg, wird eine Reihe von Ergebnissen behandelt, die die Kombinationen der Grundmodalitäten « Möglichkeit » und « Notwendigkeit » betreffen. Ausgehend von sehr allgemeinen Rahmenkodifikaten wird die durch Basisreduktion zu gewinnende Liste der endlich vielen implikativen Modalitätenlogiken mit idempotenter Möglichkeit erörtert; bei wichtigen Unterklassen der nicht notwendig idempotenten implikativen Modalitätenlogiken treten neben der Basisreduktion vor allem spezielle Entscheidungsprobleme in den Vordergrund.RésuméDans le rapport ci‐dessus (...) concernant quelques travaux de l'auteur et le travail de M. G. Emde qui s'y rapporte, il s'agit d'un ensemble de résultats sur la combinaison des modalités fondamentales de « possibilité» et de « nécessité». Partant de quelques codifications cadres très générales, I'auteur discute la liste en nombre fini des logiques modales implicatives à« possibilité» idempotente, une liste qui est obtenue par une réduction des bases. Quant à certaines sous‐classes importantes des logiques implicatives qui ne sont pas nécessairement idempotentes, outre la réduction des bases, les problèmes de décision qui leur sont spéciaux, se trouvent placés au premier plan.In the present report on some papers of the author and on a sequel to them by G. Emde, Marburg, a series of results concerning the combination of the basic modalities « possibility » and « necessity » are treated. Starting from some very general framing‐codifications, the list of the finitely many implicative modal logics with idempotent « possibility » which is obtainable through basis reduction is discussed. Besides basis reduction, in the case of some important subclasses of the not‐necessarily‐idempotent implicative modal logics, attention is given to the special decision problems. (shrink)

A crucial problem of conflict management is that whatever happens in negotiations will be interpreted and framed by stakeholders based on their different belief-value systems and world views. This problem will be discussed in the first part of this article as the main cognitive problem of conflict management. The second part develops a general semiotic solution of this problem, based on Charles Peirce's concept of "diagrammatic reasoning." The basic idea is that by representing one 's thought in diagrams, the conditions (...) that determine interpretations can become visible, we can "experiment" with them, and we can change them eventually. The third part, finally, focuses on a concrete tool, called Logical Argument Mapping , that can be used in conflict management to perform such diagrammatic reasoning and to cope with the cognitive problems discussed in the first part. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the sovereignty over Jerusalem will be used as an example to show how LAM could work in practice. (shrink)

Brian Wormald provides a fundamental reappraisal of one of the most complex and innovative figures of the late-Elizabethan and Jacobean age. In the centuries since his death, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) has been perceived and studied as a promoter and prophet of the philosophy of science--natural science--but he saw himself also as a clarifier and promoter of what he called "policy" or the study and improvement of the structure and function of civil states. Mr. Wormald shows that Bacon was concerned equally (...) with the knowledge of the world of nature and with that of policy. The junction between the two enterprises was effected by his work in history; and in the end it was Bacon's conception and practice of history that provided the answer to his efforts to advance policy and natural philosophy. (shrink)

Based on a typology of five basic forms of abduction, I propose a new definition of abductive insight that empha sizes in particular the inferential structure of a belief system that is able to explain a phenomenon after a new, abductive ly created component has been added to this system or the entire system has been abductively restructured. My thesis is, first, that the argumentative structure of the pursued problem solution guides abductive creativity and, second, that diagrammatic reasoning—if conceptualized according (...) to the requirements defined by Charles Peirce—can support this guidance. This support is mainly possible based on the normative power of the system of representation that has to be used to construct diagrams and to perform experiments with them. (shrink)

The paper aims to show how by elaborating the Peircean terms used in the title creativity in learning processes and in scientific discoveries can be explained within a semiotic framework. The essential idea is to emphasize both the role of external representations and of experimenting with those representations , and to describe a process consisting of three steps: First, looking at diagrams "from a novel point of view" offers opportunities to synthesize elements of these diagrams which have never been perceived (...) as connected before. Second, by forming those observed syntheses to "new objects" of thinking, and by signifying these objects through new signs , new means of thinking and acting are created . And finally, by applying these new means – in proofs, for instance – the "intelligibility" of new discoveries and their power to explain problematic facts must be tested. (shrink)

This argument map represents the argumentation of Sparrow, R. . "Just say No" to Drones. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, M 1932-4529/12, 56-63. doi: 10.1109/MTS.2012.2185275. The argument map is open for debate in AGORA-net, search for map ID 9712.

This argument map represents an argumentation from Heyns, C. . Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns . S.l.: United Nations. Human Rights Council. The argument map is open for debate in AGORA-net, search for map ID 9206.

Chomsky’s conception of semantics must contend with both philosophical skepticism and contrary traditions in linguistics. In “Two Dogmas” Quine argued that “...it is non-sense, and the root of much non-sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.” If so, it follows that language as the object of semantic investigation cannot be separated from collateral information. F. R. Palmer pursues a similar contention in his recent survey of issues in semantic theory: (...) “...it is impossible even in theory to draw a clear line between the meaning of a word or sentence and all possible relevant information about it.” In spite of such skepticism, and through a variety of theories, devotion to lexical decomposition and truth dependent on language has not abated. The purpose of this paper is to focus related criticism and briefly put forward an alternative conception of empirical semantics. (shrink)